Monthly Archives: July 2010

Videos of Flotilla Incident as Presented by Eiland Team of Experts (Hebrew Version), 13 July 2010

Posted on by

Below are videos of the Gaza flotilla incident as presented by the Eiland team of experts in Hebrew, accompanied by a description of the video’s content in English. The English version of the videos will be up shortly.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8pGSKUbe7Y]

The events leading up to and throughout the flotilla incident are recounted in the video, as presented by the team of experts led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland in the IDF’s internal inquiry.

In light of weapons smuggling attempts, a maritime closure was established during the 2008-2009 Gaza Operation. Under the guise of providing humanitarian aid, a number of ships have attempted to reach the Gaza Strip, some permitted to enter, while others were stopped.

Due to these attempts, the IDF General Staff and Navy outlined orders to prepare for future attempts to break the closure, and in preparing for the May 31st flotilla, the IDF planned far in advance with extended discussion, and various simulation model scenarios. IDF attaches abroad and foreign attaches to Israel were all briefed in advance.

In addition, the Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi sent a letter to the Defense Minister and Prime Minister emphasizing the following:

“Cooperation between nation ministries is required and the military option which includes seizing, confiscating and detaining the ship’s activists is a last resort and at a low priority.”

The video goes on to describe the various ships in the flotilla and the courses of their attempted journey to the Gaza Strip, as well as the number and extent of Israeli response ships, aircraft, and absorption center for the ships’ passengers.

The video also outlines the orders given to the IDF soldiers boarding the flotilla ships, including the policy of using gradual force, and using live weapons only in life threatening scenarios.

The first phase of the operation: The IDF relayed the message that the flotilla ships were in an area of a maritime closure, and offered the ships to transfer their cargo from the Ashdod Port to the Gaza Strip. The Sofia ship did not respond at all, while the other ships responded with refusal and/or profanity.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBt03XYIUSY]

In Part 2 of the Eiland Presentation, the second phase of the flotilla incident is recounted.

The IDF forces were divided and each group boarded a different ship. The soldiers arrived at the Mavi Marmara at 4:28 AM, but could not board the ship due to metal objects being thrown at them, and electric buzz saws used by the demonstrators to slice the ladders IDF soldiers needed to board the Marmara. After an unsuccessful attempt to board the ship by smaller boats, a helicopter arrived at 4:30 AM with 15 IDF soldiers. The first rope dropped by the helicopters was tied by the demonstrators to the deck of the ship in order to prevent the soldiers’ descent.

Soldiers that descended down the second rope were met by 2-4 demonstrators each who wielded knives, axes, and metal poles. The second soldier to descend was shot in the stomach by a demonstrator. The soldiers who were in danger of their lives were forced to use their live weapons. Five soldiers were injured by stabbing, blows and live fire by the demonstrators. Within seconds of boarding the ships, three soldiers were thrown off the deck by demonstrators. The injured were dragged to the hull of the ship.

A reinforcement of soldiers arrives from a second helicopter, which is also attacked by demonstrators, and the soldiers are met with violence when they attempt to access the lower deck of the ship.

At 4:46 AM a third helicopter arrives to the Mavi Marmara, and the two groups of soldiers combine forces on the ship roof and descend to the other parts of the ship, where they are also met with lethal violence, and thus respond with live fire.

Many of the demonstrators enter inside of the ship as the smaller boats arrive at the side of the ship, however some still violently attack the incoming boats and the soldiers respond with live fire.

The Commander of the Special Navy Forces boards the ship, and while evaluating the forces, it is discovered that three soldiers are missing. The missing and injured soldiers are discovered to have been abducted by a number of violent demonstrators, who abandon the soldiers and run back into the ship when fired at.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YHIAQYrRow]

Two of the injured soldiers jump off the ship so that they can be picked up by the IDF boats. The third injured soldier is on the bow of the boat and slipping out of consciousness. IDF soldiers remaining on the boat come to his aid.

At 5:17 AM the situation is evaluated and some of the findings: live fire was used by demonstrators towards IDF soldiers who were on the ship, including one soldier who descended down the rope and was shot in the abdomen. Live fire by the demonstrators was also aimed at the soldiers on the small Israeli Navy boats next to the Marmara. The first occurence of live fire was that used by the demonstrators. In addition, a gun with emptied magazines was found in the hull of the ship.

IDF forces had boarded the other ships without incident. Treatment and evacuation was carried out for the injured soldiers and demonstrators alike. 38 injured were airlifted, 7 of them soldiers.

The three soldiers who had been attempted to be kidnapped and were taken to the hull of the ship were witness to an argument between the violent demonstrators, and other passengers of the Marmara who asked the violent demonstrators to cease their violent activity.

24 of the injured passengers were diagnosed at the Ashdod Port and treated in hospitals in Israel.

After the operation ended, the ships arrived at the Ashdod Port accompanied by Israeli Naval forces. An intelligence investigation following the flotilla incident found that 40 of the IHH activists previously boarded the Marmara ship from Istanbul before joining the others.

The 8 of the 9 demonstrators killed were members of the IHH or other allied groups. Around half of those killed had declared in front of their families their aspiration to die as martyrs (“shahids”). Footage on the Marmara shows that the violence had been prepared: metal poles and chains were prepared, slingshots, buzzsaws, gas masks, tear gas, bulletproof vests, knives, and more. A briefing had taken place before the IDF had boarded the ship, with the leader of the violent demonstrators telling the group to attack the IDF soldiers at any cost.

There were 718 total passengers of the flotilla ships. Most were released without undergoing any investigation. The last passenger left on June 6th.

The IDF Chief of the General Staff Refers to the Conclusions of the Eiland Report, 12 July 2010

Posted on by

The IDF Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, announced today the adoption by the IDF of the Eiland Report examining the flotilla incident, “Winds of the Sky 7″ and the conclusions reached by its expert team following their examination. The Chief of the General Staff thanked the team and its head, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland, for the thorough and comprehensive examination, which was presented to him and to a group of other commanders this morning.

The Chief of the General Staff appointed the IDF Operations Branch as well as the Doctrine and Training Division to gather the conclusions and observe their implementation by all of the relevant IDF branches. The Chief of the General Staff said that this sort of an examination by experts is at the heart of the IDF’s organizational values as a supervised, transparent institution constantly learning from itself which aims to continue and improve in order to face challenges that lie ahead.

Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi added that the flotilla incident is a learning opportunity that should not be wasted, in order to reach conclusions for the future. “The IDF is confident enough to critically examine and improve itself based on these conclusions. This is the heart and soul of the IDF,” said the Chief of the General Staff, and added: “Neither I nor the examination team identified a failure or negligence, but nonetheless an examination as thorough as this brings up mistakes which must be corrected for future incidents.”

The Chief of the General Staff expressed his appreciation for the Israel Navy and its Naval Commando Unit, which for the past three and a half years proved its unique and high level of capability of boarding boats during various known and publically unknown incidents. He stated: “We continue to send our soldiers every day, in the air, on land and at sea, to missions which are much more dangerous than this flotilla. We want them to continue to take charge and accept risks. I wouldn’t want commanders and soldiers to embark on future missions which are much more complicated and dangerous, knowing that back on land, or beyond their home borders, there awaits an investigation committee. Therefore, the centrality of this examination, its thoroughness and quality, are a central method in our military culture.”

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland Submits Conclusions of Military Examination Team Regarding Mavi Marmara, 12 July 2010

Posted on by

July 12, 2010

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland Presents the Chief of the General Staff with the Conclusions of his Examination Team

The IDF Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, received the conclusions reached by a team of experts, headed by Maj. Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland, tasked with examining the incidents that took place at sea on May 31st 2010.

Maj. Gen. Eiland presented the team’s findings and conclusions to the Chief of the General Staff as well as to officers from the General Staff and from other IDF branches and directorates who were involved in the preparations and in the actual boarding of the flotilla. The core of the report was presented the Minister of Defense of Israel as well.

The team was appointed by the Chief of the General Staff to examine the deployment towards the flotilla, the chosen course of action and other possible alternatives, advance preparations, and the operation’s implementation.

The team included eight officers and their examination focused on intelligence, Naval command, the naval commando unit responsible for carrying out the operation, the Israel Air Force, media relations, technological alternatives, medical aspects and legal counsel and international law.

The examination presented various lessons on a broad, systemic level, not only as regards this specific operation (stopping the flotilla).

In terms of the intelligence effort, the team concluded that not all possible intelligence gathering methods were fully implemented and that the coordination between Navy Intelligence and the Israel Defense Intelligence was insufficient. At the same time, the team emphasized that it is not certain that an optimal intelligence effort would create a complete intelligence picture. The team also pointed out that the anticipated level of violence used against the forces was underestimated.

In terms of situation assessments towards the flotilla, the team clarified that the operation relied excessively on a single course of action, albeit a probable one, while no alternative courses of action were prepared for the event of more dangerous scenarios.

Regarding technological alternatives, the team determined that on the day of the incident, decision makers were not presented with alternative operational courses of action other than a full boarding of the flotilla.  The team emphasized the fact that as far as is currently known, no country in the world holds the ability to stop a vessel at sea in a non hostile manner. Therefore statements made on this matter following the incident are unfounded and irresponsible. At the same time, the team determined that alternative courses of action could have existed had the process of preparation begun enough time in advance, and recommended to accelerate the process of examining alternative methods.

The expert team determined that regarding media relations, the preparations made in advance were good. However, the release of press statements and visual materials was delayed due to the need to maintain reliability, the obligation to notify the families of the critically injured soldiers and the long authorization process at the levels above the IDF Spokesperson Unit. The team noted with favor the work of the IDF spokesperson following the incident and emphasized the need for better coordination between the IDF, the foreign ministry and other foreign affairs institutions.

In terms of operation command, the team determined that the location of the commanders during the incident and the presence of the Commander of the Israel Navy at sea during the operation, was proper and fit with the Chief of the General Staff’s view regarding the role of commanders at the front lines of IDF activity. His presence proved effective in terms of the decision making process, saving lives and more. The team praised the Israel Navy combat protocols, the preparations of the Naval Commando Unit, the Navy Command, the Electronic Warfare Formation and the medical evacuation.

The team determined that the Navy Commando soldiers operated properly, with professionalism, bravery and resourcefulness and that the commanders exhibited correct decision making. The report further determines that the use of live fire was justified and that the entire operation is estimable.

The team noted with favor the various stages of medical evacuation of the injured by air and by sea, including the injured passengers of the Mavi Marmara. In addition the team pointed out the serious attitude with which the General Staff and the Israel Navy approached the matter, as expressed in the preparations.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland noted with favor the degree of cooperation and transparency exhibited by those involved in the examination at all levels. In the summary of the examination Maj. Gen. Eiland determined that the issue should be viewed with perspective, being that the damage caused to Israel is not as severe as it seemed following the incident. In addition, he said that a there’s a tendency to draw general conclusions based on a single incident and that “the fact that the IDF examines itself and others do not, results in that only the errors of the IDF are publicized,” according to Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland.

Intelligence Maps: How Hezbollah Uses Lebanese Villages as Military Bases, 7 July 2010

Posted on by

The following declassified intelligence maps as well as the 3D animated clip illustrate how Hezbollah, in the four years since the Second Lebanon War, has turned over 100 villages in South Lebanon into military bases. These maps and the 3D clip illustrate how Hezbollah stores their weapons near schools, hospitals, and residential buildings in the village of al-Khiam. They follow similar tactics in villages across southern Lebanon, essentially using the residents as human shields, in gross violation of UN Resolution 1701. al-Khiam was used as a rocket launching site during the Second Lebanon war.

During the Second Lebanon war, Hezbollah stored their weapons in open areas for the most part, which enabled the IDF to locate and destroy their stores. In the four years since then, Hezbollah has pursued a tactic of moving their weapons into civilian villages, essentially institutionalizing the tactic of using human shields on a large scale.

[scribd id=34028905 key=key-cd13ouq745dutbb1fev mode=list]

Hezbollah-Activity-in-South-Lebanon-Since-the-2nd-Lebanon-War

3D animated video clip of the Lebanese village, al-Khiam:

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBaHS5dyfX0]

In an incident on 12 October 2009, there was an explosion at a Hezbollah weapons storehouse in the village of Tayr Filsay. Aerial footage, taken shortly after the explosion, shows Hezbollah operatives closing down the area around the warehouse, driving in two trucks and removing weaponry from the site. They then took the weapons to a known weapons storage facility in the center of the village of Dir a-Nahar about four kilometers away. Only after Hezbollah removed the weaponry did they allow UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army to enter the site of the explosion.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4TRcgjU-JAA]

IDF Military Advocate General Takes Disciplinary Action, 6 Jul. 2010 Indicts Soldiers Following Investigations into Incidents during Operation Cast Lead,

Posted on by

The IDF Military Advocate General, Maj. Gen. Avichai Mendelblit, has decided to take legal action regarding a number of incidents that occurred during Operation Cast Lead, following his examination of the findings from the investigations carried out through a number of different channels.

The Military Advocate General has decided to indict a number of officers and soldiers for their conduct during the operation.  In one case, an IDF officer at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel was summoned to a disciplinary hearing for having deviated from military directives pertaining to the prohibition on the use of civilians for operational activity. In a second case, the Military Advocate General indicted an IDF Staff Sergeant for manslaughter. In a third case, the Military Advocate General ordered a criminal investigation following his review of a field investigation in order to clarify the circumstances of a specific incident. In a fourth case, disciplinary action was taken against an IDF Captain for his failed professional judgment in authorizing an attack against a terror operative.

In accordance with the Chief of the General Staff’s commitment on the matter, an ongoing, comprehensive process of examination has been carried out within the IDF since the conclusion of Operation Cast Lead, in order to study claims made by various individuals and organizations regarding IDF conduct during the operation.

Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi ordered an examination of IDF conduct, and the ethical aspects thereof, in full confidence of the moral justness of the IDF, its officers and soldiers, as well as of the IDF’s ability to examine any incident, to draw the necessary conclusions, and to take legal action as necessary. More than 150 incidents have been examined and nearly 50 investigations have been launched by the Military Police Criminal Investigations Division since the operation’s conclusion.

Furthermore, the report of the United Nations fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict (i.e. the “Goldstone Report”) was published in September 2009, presenting 30 specific incidents related to the IDF, most of which were already familiar to the IDF and were in various stages of examination prior to the report’s publication.

The examinations of the majority of incidents mentioned in the report have concluded in recent months, and their findings were transferred to the Military Advocate General for his examination and decision.  The Military Advocate General has now concluded his examination and has drawn the following conclusions regarding four incidents, as follows:

Complaint by Majdi Abed-Rabo:

An investigation into a claim that a Palestinian man was used as a “human shield” was opened by the Military Police Criminal Investigations Division, in accordance with the investigative policies of the IDF, which require that a criminal investigation be opened regarding claims of this kind.

The complainant, dozens of soldiers, and commanders were all questioned during the investigation.  The investigation found that a battalion commander authorized the sending of a Palestinian man into a house (adjacent to his own) sheltering terrorists, in order to convince them to exit the house. The battalion commander, not present on the scene, authorized the order following reports that the Palestinian man asked the soldiers if he could do this so as to prevent the destruction of his house if a battle were to transpire.

The Military Advocate General indicted the battalion commander because he deviated from authorized and appropriate IDF behavior, and the Israeli Supreme Court jurisdiction regarding the use of civilians during operational activity, when he authorized the Palestinian’s request to enter the house.

The disciplinary process was carried out before GOC Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, who convicted and warned the officer.

The Complaint by the Hajaj Family:

The original investigation into the incident was based on a claim, which also appeared in the “Goldstone Report,” that fire killed two women on January 4th, 2009, in the neighborhood of Juhar Al-Dik. It was claimed that the women were part of a group of civilians, some of whom were carrying white flags.

Palestinian witnesses and dozens of soldiers and commanders were questioned as part of the comprehensive investigation which found gaps between the testimonies given by the soldiers and those given by Palestinians. This fact made it impossible to make a criminal connection between the described incident according to Palestinian testimonies and to that described by the soldiers.

The soldiers testified that on January 5th, 2009 it was a man that was shot and killed in the same location described by Palestinian witnesses.

After reviewing the evidence, the Military Advocate General ordered that an IDF Staff Sergeant be indicted with charges of manslaughter by a military court.  This decision is based on evidence that the soldier, who was serving as a designated marksman, deliberately targeted an individual walking with a group of people waving a white flag without being ordered or authorized to do so.

Despite the fact that the two events are apparently one and the same, from a judicial point of view, sufficient connections could not be made between the evidence gathered in the case of the indicted soldier and the event described by Palestinian testimonies.

The Al-Samouni Residence Incident

According to several claims, a residence in the neighborhood of Zaitun, housing about one hundred members of the Al-Samouni family, was struck from the air on January 5th, 2009. In light of the event’s complexity, the IDF Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi appointed an expert to investigate the incident.

After examining the findings of the investigation, Maj. Gen. Mendelblit has ordered a Military Police criminal investigation into the circumstances of the incident. The findings of the criminal investigation will be passed on to the Military Advocate General with its conclusion.

Ibrahim Al-Makadma Mosque

The claim regarding the strike against the Ibrahim Al-Makadma mosque was first examined as part of the five expert-led investigations as ordered by Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi at the conclusion of the operation. Based on aerial footage, among other evidence, it appeared that the mosque was not hit.

Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi ordered that the incident be re-examined by an additional expert after receiving several reports from various organizations, some of which were issued after the conclusion of the first investigation.

It became apparent that there was in fact an aerial strike in close proximity of the mosque, and this was communicated in an earlier report by the State of Israel to the UN. The aerial strike targeted a terror operative involved in the launching of rockets toward Israel who was standing outside of the mosque. Injuries caused to civilians inside were unintentional and caused by shrapnel that penetrated the mosque.

The investigation also showed that the officer who ordered the attack had failed to exercise appropriate judgment. Therefore, the Chief of the General Staff ordered that disciplinary actions be taken against the officer, and that he would not serve in similar positions of command in the future. The officer also stood trial for negligence before the Commander of the Ground Forces Training Center, Brig. Gen. Avi Ashkenazi, who rebuked him for his actions.

The findings of the investigation were handed over to the Military Advocate General’s Unit. The Military Advocate General decided that the attack did not violate international laws of warfare because the attack did not target the mosque, rather it targeted a terror operative, and when the attack was authorized, no possibility of harming civilians was identified. According to this assessment, the Military Advocate General decided that legal measures were not necessary.

It was also decided that legal measures would not be taken in additional incidents examined by the Military Advocate General because according to the rules of warfare, no faults were found in the forces’ actions. In other cases, there was not enough evidence proving that legal measures needed to be taken.

It should be noted that the IDF conducted the operation after eight years in which Hamas fired rockets at hundreds of Israeli civilians living in the southern communities surrounding the Gaza Strip.  Despite the fire and the injuries suffered by Israel, Israel practiced a policy of restraint for a long period of time. Since Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip, the terrorist organization has implanted its military system and terrorist infrastructure in the heart of urban areas while using the population as human shields.  Operation Cast Lead was limited in the scope of fire and forces used. IDF soldiers operated in crowded urban areas while Hamas made deliberate and cynical use of the Palestinian population, creating a complex security situation. Hamas operated from within civilian homes, schools, kindergartens, mosques, hospitals and UN facilities while the population in the Gaza Strip was made hostage.

Remarks by IDF Officials at IAF Flight School Graduation Ceremony, 1 Jul. 2010

Posted on by

Remarks by IDF Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, during  the IAF Flight School graduation ceremony:

“Dear soldiers, the skies of the Middle East, which you are soon about to encounter in your aircraft, are covered with clouds of threats, both near and far. The attempts by several states and terrorist organizations to de-legitimize the State of Israel, highlights that in this just struggle, only a strong military, which relies on a powerful air force, can meet the difficult challenges ahead. These sensitive times in which we live make the responsibility [that rests] on your shoulders much greater.”

The graduation ceremony took place today in the Hazerim Air Force base. The pilots received their “flight wings” after finishing a three-year long course during which they were trained as pilots and officers in addition to receiving an academic degree from the Ben Gurion University. The President of the State of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak,  Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, Israel Air Force Commander, Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan were present at the ceremony in addition to family, guests, friends and IAF personnel.

During the ceremony, Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan said:

“Today, the air force holds the highest capabilities and best air craft in the world… Substantial work has been put into developing these capabilities, in day or night, to face challenges near and far. We have reached new grounds with our un-manned aerial vehicles and even managed to make a single, very important step into space. We are proud of this progress…”

IAF Targets Weapons Facility in Gaza, 1 July 2010

Posted on by

July 1st, 2010

In Response to Rocket Fire, IAF Targets Weapons Manufacturing Facility, Terror Tunnel & Terror Activity Site in Gaza Strip

The Israel Air Force struck a weapons manufacturing facility in the northern Gaza Strip in addition to a terror tunnel and terror activity site in the southern Gaza Strip overnight. The terror tunnel was dug approximately one kilometer away from the security fence and is intended for infiltrating into Israel and executing terror attacks against IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians. The attack is in response to the rocket that was fired at Israel and damaged a factory in the Sdot Negev Regional Council on Wednesday morning, June 30th 2010. Over 90 rockets and mortar shells have been fired at Israeli territory since the beginning of 2010, and over 330 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the end of operation Cast Lead. The IDF remains committed to protecting the citizens of Israel and will continue to act against terror. The IDF holds Hamas solely responsible for terror emanating from the Gaza Strip.